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Abstract
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically inter-
connected propositions into a collective judgment on the same proposi-
tions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggrega-
tion procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure
an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment
aggregation refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma. In this
paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is
factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good
various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two
approaches: distance-based procedures and a Bayesian analysis. They
correspond to group-internal and group-external decision-making, respec-
tively. We compare those methods in a probabilistic model whose assump-
tions are subsequently relaxed. The findings vindicate that in judgment
aggregation problems, (i) reasons should carry higher weight in the vot-
ing procedure than the conclusion, and (ii) considering members of an
advisory board to be highly competent is a better strategy than to under-
estimate their advice.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation [7, 8, 11] is an emerging research area in economics. It
investigates how to aggregate individual judgments on logically related proposi-
tions to a group judgment on those propositions. Examples of groups that need
to aggregate individual judgments are expert panels, legal courts, boards, and
councils. The propositions are of two kinds: premises and a conclusion. The
first serve as supporting reasons to derive a judgment on the conclusion. Con-
sider, for example, a city council that has to make a decision on whether to build
a new harbor site (represented by a proposition C, the conclusion). This project
is eligible for public funding if and only if two premises are satisfied: first, there
is sufficient request for new harbor sites that cannot be met by existing harbor
sites (represented by proposition A1), and second, the nearby marine reserve is
not badly affected (represented by proposition A2). The decision rule can be
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A1 A2 C
Agents 1, 2, 3 Yes Yes Yes
Agents 4, 5 Yes No No
Agents 6, 7 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 1: An illustration of the discursive dilemma under the aggregation rule
(A1 ∧A2)↔ C.
formally expressed as the formula (A1 ∧A2)↔ C. Each member of the council
expresses her judgment on A1, A2 and C such that the rule (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ C is
satisfied.
How shall we derive a group judgment given the individuals’ opinions on
premises and conclusion? It is assumed that each individual expresses judgments
on the propositions while respecting the logical relations. If we define the group
opinion as the majority view on the issues (premises and conclusion), it turns
out that the group may take an inconsistent position, as shown in Table 1. The
city council may face a situation where the majority thinks that the new harbor
site should not be built. However, it will not be possible to provide reasons
for this judgment as a majority of the members agrees that there is sufficient
request for further harbor sites and another majority agrees that the nearby
marine reserve is not badly affected. The literature on judgment aggregation
refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma.
Two ways to avoid the paradox are the premise-based procedure (PBP) and
the conclusion-based procedure (CBP) [2, 14]. According to PBP, each member
expresses her judgment on each premise. The conclusion is then inferred from
the rule (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ C and from the judgment of the group majority on A1
and A2. If the individuals of the example followed the PBP, the new harbor site
would be approved of. On the other hand, according to the CBP, the members
privately decide on A1 and A2 and only express their opinions on C publicly.
The judgment of the group is then inferred from applying the majority rule to
the individual judgments on C. In the above example, the application of the
CBP would stop the harbor project, contradicting the results of PBP.
The relevance of such aggregation problems goes beyond the specific city
council example, because it applies to all situations where individual binary
evaluations need to be combined into a group decision. Furthermore, the prob-
lem of aggregating individual judgments is not restricted to majority voting,
but it applies to all aggregation procedures satisfying some seemingly desirable
conditions. For an overview on the impossibility results and on the character-
izations of aggregation rules and decision problems provided by the literature,
the reader is referred to [12].
In this paper we assume that a group judgment is factually right or wrong
and address the question of how reliable various approaches are at selecting the
right conclusion. In other words, we ask whether some natural and plausible
methods can be trusted in practice, generalizing the approach of Bovens and
Rabinowicz [1] and of List [9] (see also [10]). We adopt two different perspec-
tives, both common and important in public decision-making: First we compare
the performance of a group of methods that can be characterized as distance-
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based procedures, among them the majority fusion operator [5, 6, 15]. They
are essentially functions from a N -tuple of individual judgment sets to a group
judgment on a conclusion. Here, the crucial question is how much weight the
judgments on the conclusion should get, compared to the judgments on the
premises. Second, we ask how an external decision-maker would aggregate the
group members’ judgments if she took additional information into account, e.g.
assessments of the group members’ individual competence or the conclusion’s
(prior) probability. This group-external perspective is implemented by means of
a full Bayesian analysis and serves as a benchmark for the distance-based pro-
cedures. Moreover, we extract recommendations for group-external judgment
aggregation under incomplete, or even misleading information.
We analyze the reliability of judgment aggregation procedures in a prob-
abilistic model, relying on analytical results as well as numerical simulations.
In particular, we embed CBP, PBP and the majority fusion operator, into a
family of distance-based procedures (Section 2). We study the properties of that
family of aggregation methods and demonstrate the robustness of our results
by relaxing the model assumptions (Section 3). Then we review the results of
section 3 from a Bayesian perspective and compare group-internal (distance-
based) to group-external aggregation procedures (Section 4). Finally, we derive
recommendations for policy-making and sum up the main insights (Section 5).
2 The General Model: Distance-Based Proce-
dures
The premise- and the conclusion-based procedures represent two extremes: PBP
is only a function of the judgments on the premises, CBP is only a function of the
judgments on the conclusion. This prompts the question of whether we can give
a general description of aggregation procedures which combine the judgments
on premises and conclusion, with PBP and CBP as extreme points.
A typical aggregation procedure which considers all elements of a judgment
set is the majority fusion operator (MFO). MFO represents all positive verdicts
with one, and all negative verdicts with zero (see [15] for a precise definition).
Table 2 illustrates MFO in the harbor example from the introduction – the
judgment set which comes closest to the group average, calculated by compo-
nentwise distances, is selected by MFO. Thus, each premise has the same weight
as the conclusion in determining the group outcome.
The idea to use distance-based approaches as a method to resolve inconsis-
tencies stems from computer science [5, 6]: the intuition is that an inconsis-
tent database is replaced by the consistent database that comes “closest” to it.
Pigozzi [15] was the first to apply distance-based methods to the problem of
judgment aggregation.
We generalize Pigozzi’s approach and present a continuum of distance-based
procedures, parametrized by a real number t ≥ 0 which contains PBP and CBP
as extremes. The introductory example of two premises is generalized to an
aggregation problem where the conclusion is satisfied if and only if M premises
are jointly satisfied. In other words, we deal with the aggregation rule (A1∧A2∧
. . .∧AM )↔ C where the Ai denote the premises and C denotes the conclusion.
Notably, our analysis extends to other truth-functional combinations of the
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A1 A2 C Total
Agents 1,2,3 1 1 1 —
Agents 4,5 1 0 0 —
Agents 6,7 0 1 0 —
Average 5/7 5/7 3/7 —
Distance to (1,1,1) 2/7 2/7 4/7 8/7
Distance to (1,0,0) 2/7 5/7 3/7 10/7
Distance to (0,1,0) 5/7 2/7 3/7 10/7
Distance to (0,0,0) 5/7 5/7 3/7 13/7
Table 2: The majority fusion operator in the harbor example of Table 1. It
turns out that {A1, A2, C} is the consistent judgment set that comes closest to
the average of the group members’ judgments.
premises as well, e.g. the disjunctive aggregation rule (A1∨A2∨ . . .∨AM )↔ C
because this rule is equivalent to (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬AM )↔ ¬C. In general,
our analysis captures all aggregation rules where the conclusion is true (false)
in only one consistent judgment set.
Therefore, we restrict ourselves in the sequel to the conjunctive aggregation
rule (A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ AM ) ↔ C. 2M judgment sets are consistent with it. We
represent them as sets of propositional letters and order them as follows:
s0 = {A1, A2, . . . , AM , C} s1 = {¬A1, A2, . . . , AM ,¬C}
s2 = {A1,¬A2, . . . , AM ,¬C} . . .
sM = {A1, A2, . . . ,¬AM ,¬C} sM+1 = {¬A1,¬A2, A3, . . . , AM ,¬C}
sM+2 = . . . s2M−1 = {¬A1,¬A2, . . . ,¬AM ,¬C}.
Define S := {si|0 ≤ i ≤ 2M − 1}. Now, distance-based approaches identify the
elements of S (i.e. consistent judgment sets) with a set of points in RM+1, in
order to calculate the distance between each judgment set and the average of
the group members’ judgment. This subset of RM+1 is, for each t ≥ 0, defined
by
Ot := {x ∈ {0, 1}M × {0, t}|xM+1 = t
M∏
i=1
xi}.
Ot defines the set of admissible judgment vectors (see table 2): a positive judg-
ment on a premise (“A1”) is naturally identified with a 1, a negative judgment
(“¬A2”) with a 0, and the judgment of the conclusion (the M + 1-th entry of
the vector) is determined by the judgments on the premises. 1
By this rationale, we obtain a canonical isomorphism Mt : S → Ot, mapping
judgment sets to their geometric representations, and vice versa:
(Mt(si))j =

1 if (j ≤M) ∧ (Aj ∈ si)
t if (j = M + 1) ∧ (i = 0)
0 otherwise.
(1)
1. Thus, xM+1, the conclusion entry, is assigned either 0 or t – the point of introducing the
parameter t consists in manipulating the relative weight of the judgment on the conclusion,
compared to the judgments on the premises. See below.
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For a set of N group members, we can now define a family of distance-based
aggregation procedures (DM,Nt )t≥0 : SN → {C,¬C} that map N consistent in-
dividual judgment sets to a group judgment on the conclusion C. 2 The idea
is to calculate the distance between the geometric representations of the “aver-
age judgment” and each consistent judgment set, and to opt for the consistent
judgment set that comes closest to the group average. More precisely, DM,Nt is
defined by
DM,Nt (s
(1), . . . , s(N)) :=
{
C if d0t < min1≤i≤2M−1 d
j
t
¬C otherwise, (2)
where
dit := ‖Mt(si)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
Mt(s(j))‖1, (3)
takes the distance between Mt(si) and 1N
∑N
j=1Mt(s
(j)), by means of the 1-norm
or Hamming distance (i.e., the componentwise sum of the absolute values of a
vector). 3 In particular, DM,Nt opts for conclusion C if and only if the (unique)
judgment set that is compatible with C – namely s0 = {A1, A2, . . . , AM , C} – is
closer to the average submission of the group members than any other consistent
judgment set. As equations (2) and (3) indicate, the term “closer” is defined by
means of the distance in an appropriately transformed space, where parameter t
governs the transformation map. Informally spoken, t expresses the extra weight
assigned to the agents’ judgment on the conclusion, apart from the information
on C that is contained in the agents’ judgments on the premises.
Now, PBP and CBP are part of the DM,Nt -continuum, namely as the two
extremes of the spectrum. Also, DM,N1 agrees with MFO (all proofs are in the
appendix):
Proposition 1
DM,Nt =

PBP if t = 0
MFO if t = 1
CBP if t =∞.
In other words, the lower t, the more DM,Nt resembles the premise-based
procedure because the judgments on the conclusion carry little weight, compared
to the judgments on the premises. Vice versa for t → ∞. In the remainder of
the paper, we discuss the properties of the DM,Nt -family, with special emphasis
on three particular procedures: DM,N0 (the PBP), D
M,N
1 (the MFO) and D
M,N
∞
(the CBP).
2. We differ from Miller and Osherson’s [13] distance-based aggregation methods in several
respects, most notably our specific parametrization, and our focus on the reliability of a
method.
3. Note that in the group average, the M + 1-th component is also parametrized by t, in
order to express the relative weight which the judgments on the conclusion obtain.
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3 Distance-Based Procedures: A Comparison
3.1 The Model
To compare the reliability of the distance-based procedures, we adopt a prob-
abilistic framework. In particular, each agent is assigned an individual compe-
tence p ∈ (0, 1) to make a correct judgment about a single premise, independent
of whether Ai or its negation ¬Ai is true. In other words, the members’ judg-
ments on each premise are treated as independent random variables that mirror
the truth with a certain probability p. 4 We could, for instance, imagine that
the council members are laymen in the subject matter, have large files on both
premises (supply/demand analysis and sustainability) and their task consists in
evaluating these data without being misled.
Under suitable assumptions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem links the com-
petence of the agents to the reliability of majority voting: if individual agents
are better than randomizers at judging the truth or falsity of a premise (in
other words, if p > 0.5), and if they form their opinions independently, then
majority voting eventually yields the right collective judgment on Ai with in-
creasing size of the group. This general fact motivates the use of majority-based
decision-making in the judgment aggregation problem, e.g. in PBP and CBP.
Now we make the assumptions of our model explicit. They are also required
to avoid computational complexity (cf. [1]):
(i) The marginal probabilities of the premises are equal (P(Ai) = P(Aj)).
(ii) The premises are (logically and probabilistically) independent.
(ii) All agents have the same (independent) competence to assess the truth of
each single premise (= p). Their judgments on the premises are indepen-
dent.
(iv) Each individual judgment set is logically consistent.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) entail that we can parametrize the set of prior
distributions by a single parameter q := P(Ai) = P(Aj). Then, we can define
the reliability Rp,q(D
M,N
t ) of a distance-based procedure for given parameter
values N , p, q and t as the probability that the right conclusion is selected: 5
Rp,q(D
M,N
t ) := q
M P(DM,Nt = C|C) + (1− qM )P(DM,Nt = ¬C|¬C). (4)
3.2 Reliability of the Distance-Based Procedures
With equation (4) at hand, we can compare the reliability of various distance-
based procedures.
4. It would, of course, also be possible to assign two different competences p′ and p′′ to the
agents, one for correctly discerning Ai and one for correctly discerning ¬Ai. But then, the
agents’ overall competence would be coupled to the prior probabilities of the various situations:
p = p′ P(Ai)+p′′ (1−P(Ai)) (P(Ai) denoting the marginal probability of Ai). – We ascribe an
individual competence only for voting on premises, not for voting on any proposition (such as
Ai ∧ Aj). Indeed, in many contexts, such as the harbor example, it is apparently reasonable
to assign individual voting competence only to judgments on “elementary”, matter-of-fact
propositions, and not to complex propositions.
5. Here and in the sequel, we do not give the details of our calculations, apart from the
proofs of the propositions which are contained in the appendix. These details can be readily
provided, but they cost lots of space, and we doubt that they lead to any important insights.
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Figure 1: Reliability of PBP (t = 0, triangles), MFO (t = 1, stars) and CBP
(t = ∞, diamonds) as a function of N , for M = 2, various values of p, and a
fixed value of q = 0.5. Upper left figure: p = 0.56. Upper right figure: p = 0.64.
Lower left figure: p = 0.72. Lower right figure p = 0.8.
Figure 1 depicts the reliability of distance-based procedures for two premises
as a function of group size N , for two premises, q = 0.5 and individual com-
petence p ∈ {0.56, 0.64, 0.72, 0.8}. 6 It turns out that for small groups and
relatively low individual competence, the PBP too often leans towards an erro-
neous judgment in favor of C. In such small groups, majorities for a premise
can emerge by random sampling effects alone and are therefore not informative.
Therefore PBP is inferior to procedures with a higher t in such circumstances.
However, if either p or q goes up (we don’t discuss the latter case, but the argu-
ment is obvious), the three procedures either do not differ much (e.g. p = 0.8),
or procedures with a low t outperform their competitors (e.g. p = 0.64). Thus,
from an epistemic perspective, voting on reasons (premises) is clearly superior
to directly voting on the conclusion as long as individual competence p, marginal
probability q and group size N are not too low.
This insight can be accounted for, and generalized, by an asymptotic anal-
ysis N → ∞: If individual competence exceeds a certain threshold, the group
judgment on the conclusion will almost certainly be right as group size increases.
First we show this for the case that the conclusion is actually true.
Proposition 2 Assume s0 = {A1, A2, . . . , AM , C} is the true judgment set.
Define
pt :=
√
2t2 + 2t + 1− 1
2t
.
Then:
lim
N→∞
P(DM,Nt = C) =
{
1 if p > pt
0 if p ≤ pt.
6. For reasons of convenience, the calculations were made for two premises only, but our
asymptotical results (Proposition 2, Corollary 1) ensure that the structure of the graphs is
preserved for M > 2, too.
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In particular, we obtain the critical values p0 = 0.5 for PBP, p1 = (
√
5−1)/2 ≈
0.618 for MFO and p∞ = 1/
√
2 ≈ 0.707 for CBP.
The result easily transfers to the general case:
Corollary 1 Let p > 0.5. Then P-a.s.:
lim
N→∞
Rp,q(D
M,N
t ) =
{
1 pt > p
1− qM otherwise. (5)
Put another way, Rp,q(D
M,N
t )
N→∞→ 1 if p is larger than the critical value
pt, and Rp,q(D
M,N
t )
N→∞→ 1 − qM otherwise. 7 Thus, Proposition 1 and Corol-
lary 1 explain why in Figure 1, the reliability of each procedure approaches
1 − q2 = 0.75 with increasing N when pt ≤ p (such as in the upper figures).
This result suggests that for medium to large size groups and unknown compe-
tence, it is preferable to confront the agents with a couple of minor questions,
rather than with one big aggregate question which requires the combination of
several independent judgments. A complex issue, such as a motion in parlia-
ment, or a plebiscite question, should, if possible, be split into several smaller
issues. For instance, if we ask the members of a city council or the participants
of a poll whether they consider the harbor project eligible for public funding,
the epistemic significance of their judgments is increased if we derive the aggre-
gate judgment from their judgments on the premises and the conclusion, rather
than directly asking them what they think about the conclusion. Note that
this effect does not stem from a supposed tendency to commit logical fallacies
when combining several judgments. Rather, procedures with high t give extraor-
dinary weight to the agents’ opinion on the conclusion. Then, agents mostly
lean towards ¬C even if each premise is widely accepted. This systematic bias
deteriorates the results unless the agents’ individual competence is very high.
3.3 Generalizations
We chose quite special and restrictive model assumptions in order to control
computational complexity. Therefore we also explore whether our results are
robust when relaxing two assumptions: (i) the loss of a “false positive” deci-
sion (for C) exceeds the loss of a “false negative” decision (for ¬C), (ii) the
independence of the premises is abandoned.
Firstly, quite often a judgment leads to an irreversible decision. For in-
stance, if the newly built harbor happens to affect the marine reserve, or if
the demands for new harbor sites are too low, we will continuously suffer from
the consequences of a wrong judgment. (Whereas if we do not approve of the
project, we are free to correct our judgment later.) In such a case, use of a
(“premise-friendly”) procedure with a low t is apparently dangerous. To deal
with that case, we have set up a utility matrix where each correct decision is
rewarded with 1 unit, a false rejection of C costs 0 units, and a false acceptance
of C costs u units, with u < 0.
Figure 2 plots the expected utility of a procedure as a function of t for
u = −0.5 and u = −1, with fairly typical values of p, q and N . We observe that
7. It is not surprising, by the way, that q enters the formula, because it expresses which
form of systematic bias (towards C or ¬C) is more important for the reliability of DM,Nt .
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Figure 2: Expected utility of the distance-based procedures as a function of t,
for M = 2, N = 11, p = q = 0.7. Left figure: u = −0.5. Right figure: u = −1.
the graph is monotonously decreasing as a function of t. In other words, even
if the costs of false acceptance are significantly higher than the costs of false
rejection, there is no need to employ a high t in aggregating the judgments.
Secondly, although in the harbor example, independence of the premises is
quite plausible, it seems to be too strong an assumption in other contexts, e.g.
when both premises express purely economic criteria. Consequently, the agents’
judgments will quite often be far from independent, e.g. they might reason from
the conclusion to the premises instead the other way round. This prompts the
question how our distance-based procedures fare in such cases. For reasons of
simplicity and computational tractability, we restrict ourselves to two premises
in extending the model.
The occurrence of such a correlation seems to question the superiority of
distance-based procedures with low t, e.g. the premise-based procedure, since
the additional information obtained by voting on two premises, instead of voting
on the conclusion, is low. To check this prediction, we set up a Bayes net with a
parent node C, P (C) = c, and the premises A1 and A2 as offsprings. This creates
a dependence between A1 and A2, expressed by x = P (A1|C) = 1−P (A1|¬C),
and analogously for A2. Leaving the rest of our model assumptions intact, we
have plotted the reliability of the distance-based procedures as a function of
the strength of the correlation involved (x = 0.5 corresponds to independence,
x = 0 or x = 1 to perfect correlation), for typical values of p and N = 7.
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Figure 3: Reliability of PBP (t = 0, dashed line), MFO (t = 0, dotted line) and
CBP (t = ∞, full line) as a function of x, for M = 2, N = 7, c = 0.3, and
p = 3/5 (left figure) compared to p = 2/3 (right figure).
To better understand Figure 3, note that the marginal probabilities of A1
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and A2 can be written as
P (A1) = P (A2) = cx + (1− c)(1− x),
which entails the probability of A1 and A2 decreases linearly as a function of x,
with slope −0.4. This means that the apparently strong performance of CBP
and MFO in the left figure, for x > 0.5, owes more to the decreasing probability
of A1 (which favors high ts), than to the increasing correlation. Once this effect
is eliminated, the distortions induced by premise correlation are very modest.
To sum up, while low t’s apparently dominate higher t’s for high individual
competence (p = 2/3), for lower competences (p = 3/5) slightly higher t’s, e.g.
t ≈ 1 are advised. This agrees with our findings from the previous subsection
which remain thus intact for both kinds of generalizations.
4 A Group-External Perspective
The distance-based procedures aggregated a N -tuple of individual judgment
sets to a final judgment on the conclusion. Potentially available additional
information was neglected. Our approach in this section addresses this issue: An
external decision-maker treats the agents’ judgments on premises and conclusion
as evidence for a final judgment on the conclusion. For instance, think of a
prime minister, a city mayor, etc. who takes into account the recommendations
of an advisory board, while having some opinion on the subject matter and
the competence of the board members. We discuss the reliability of this kind of
judgment aggregation as a function of the accuracy of the estimates of individual
competence, and compare it to the distance-based procedures.
First, let us see how this approach can serve as a benchmark for distance-
based procedures. The judgments of the agents (s(1), . . . , s(N)) are treated as
incoming evidence and used to updates prior probabilities to a posterior distri-
bution over {C,¬C}. We obtain the formula
P(C|(s(1), . . . , s(N))) =
(
1 +
1− P(C)
P(C)
P(s(1), . . . , s(N)|¬C)
P(s(1), . . . , s(N))|C)
)−1
. (6)
Thus, the optimal decision is exclusively based on the posterior probability of
C and the utility matrix which describes the decision problem. If both kinds
of error (wrong judgment in favor of/against C) are equally severe, a rational
Bayesian decision-maker will opt for C if and only if P(C|(s(1), . . . , s(N))) > 1/2.
If we add the assumptions (i)-(iv) (see page 6) that served to determine
the reliability of the distance-based procedures, the model is fully specified,
and the right hand side of (6) can be readily calculated. In particular, we
can compare the reliability of distance-based aggregation to the theoretically
optimal Bayesian aggregation. Are they close to the theoretical optimum or do
they suffer high losses?
Figure 4 gives an answer for typical values of q and N . As predicted, the
Bayesian procedure constitutes an upper bound for all other procedures. Also,
the more the agents are inclined towards either truth or falsehood, the more
informative are their judgments for an external decision-maker. Hence the sym-
metry around p = 0.5. The most notable thing is, however, that the performance
of PBP – representative of procedures that use a low t – comes very close to the
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Figure 4: The probability that the Bayesian procedure (thin-dotted line) iden-
tifies the right conclusion as a function of the competence of the agents p for
q = .7, M = 2 and N = 11, compared to distance-based procedures for t = 0
(dashed line), t = 1 (thick-dotted line) and t =∞ (full line).
theoretically optimal Bayesian procedure. In other words: Although the PBP
is a very crude procedure, we can, for typical values of q and N , barely improve
upon it, even as external decision-makers with full information on p and q. This
gives another justification for using easily implementable distance-based proce-
dures in practice, and justifies rules of thumbs, such as “discuss and vote on the
criteria for a decision, instead on the decision itself”. For instance, proposals
that are opposed by a majority of agents should not be dismissed when the
criteria for their implementation are backed by strong majorities.
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Figure 5: Reliability of the Bayesian procedure (full line) as a function of esti-
mated competence pˆ, with M = 2, N = 11, q = 0.5, p = 0.55 (left figure) and
p = 2/3 (right figure). The horizontal lines give the distance-based procedures
for t = 0 (dashed line), t = 1 (thick-dotted line) and t =∞ (thin-dotted line).
Of course, the pure Bayesian procedure is hard to implement in practice
because it demands that p and q be transparent to the decision-maker. Therefore
we investigate it under more realistic circumstances when the external decision-
maker does not know the agents’ individual competence and has to estimate
it instead. Figure 5 plots the reliability of this more realistic form of Bayesian
judgment aggregation and compares it to the performance of the distance-based
procedures.
We see that the graphs of the distance-based procedures are constant – which
is intuitively clear since they do not depend on the estimate pˆ. As expected,
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the Bayesian procedure peaks around the true value of p, outperforming the
distance-based procedures in this region. For overestimated pˆ, it is at least as
good as the PBP (t = 0), securing reasonable reliability. This is no surprise
since if the agents are deemed extremely competent, the decision-maker will
follow their majority judgments, mimicking PBP. By contrast, underestimating
p leads to very unreliable conclusions.
This yields the following, more general moral: when external decision-makers
have well-founded prior beliefs on the likelihood of the premises, and have to
assess recommendations of an advisory board, to overestimate the board’s com-
petence is a safer strategy than to underestimate it. This might explain why
reports of such boards (e.g. the IPCC report on global warming, or the Stern
report on the economics of climate change) are often treated like revealed truths:
even if we have doubts that the board members are competent enough to give
binding recommendations on such complex a matter, assuming that they are
competent is a more robust, and rational strategy than to systemically under-
estimate their competence, and to neglect their advice. Individual bias can just
be too devastating.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated some popular judgment aggregation procedures
(such as PBP, CBP and MFO) and embedded them into a more general family
of distance-based procedures. This family has been parametrized by means of
a real number t ≥ 0, where the extremes are given by the premise- and the
conclusion-based procedure.
We have proven asymptotic results for increasing group size and shown that
unless the group is quite small and the voters barely competent, distance-based
procedures with low t, such as the premise-based procedure, fare best. The
Bayesian analysis has moreover demonstrated that these procedures fare almost
as well as the theoretical optimum. Also, the results are robust with respect to
two plausible generalizations, namely changing utility matrices and correlation
among the premises. Although in real aggregation problems, the precise choice
of an aggregation procedure has to be calibrated to the group size and problem
specifics, as explained in section 3, our results substantiate a general recom-
mendation: namely the use of procedures that give a low weight to the initial
judgments on the conclusion, in particular the premise-based procedure PBP.
These distance-based approaches are easily implementable and reliably select
the right outcome without requiring judgments on individual competence.
Finally, we have adopted the perspective of an external decision-maker who
merges the recommendation of an advisory board with his own beliefs on the
subject matter and the board members’ competence. The approach is very
flexible since the decision procedure can be adapted to a lot of different problems
(by changing the utility matrix). However, the board members’ competence has
typically to be estimated. It has been shown that for incorrect estimates of p,
losses are manageable in the case of overestimation, whereas underestimation
often proves to be fatal. This result encourages policy-makers to rely on the
advice of an unbiased advisory board or committee, even if the majorities are
not convincing and the board members’ competence is hard to elicit.
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Appendix
Lemma 1: Let djt be defined according to equation (3). Then:
d0t < min1≤j≤2M−1 d
j
t ⇔ d0t < min1≤j≤M djt .
Proof of Lemma 1: ‘⇒’ is trivial. For the converse direction, assume
d0t < min1≤j≤Md
j
t and the existence of a K > M such that d0t ≥ dKt . We
conduct an indirect proof and lead this assumption ad absurdum. Assume
without loss of generality that sK = {¬A1,¬A2, . . . ,¬AL, AL+1, . . . , AM , C},
with L ≥ 2 (the Aj are interchangeable). Let aj , for any judgment set in SN ,
denote the actual number of votes for premise Aj , and accordingly for c with
respect to conclusion C. Now, we rewrite the (1-norm) distances djt between
any Mt(sj) and the group average 1N
∑N
i=1Mt(s
(i)):
d0t =
1
N
 N∑
j=1
(N − aj) + t(N − c)
 d1t = 1N
∑
j 6=1
(N − aj) + a1 + tc

d2t =
1
N
∑
j 6=2
(N − aj) + a2 + tc
 dKt = 1N
∑
j≤L
aj +
∑
j>L
(N − aj) + tc
 .
This yields for all 1 ≤ j ≤M
N(djt − d0t ) = (2aj −N) + t(2c−N). (7)
Hence djt > d0t presupposes (2aj −N) > 0 because c ≤ ai. – Finally we obtain
N(dKt − d1t ) =
∑
j≤L
aj +
L∑
j=2
(N − aj)− a1
=
L∑
j=2
aj − (N − aj)
=
L∑
j=2
2aj −N
> 0, (8)
making use of (7) and the remark thereafter. – (8) contradicts the assumption
that dKt ≤ d0t < d1t . 
Proof of Proposition 1: DM,N1 = MFO is obvious (compare table 2). We
show that DM,N0 = PBP and D
M,N
∞ = CBP. Recall that D
N,M
t = C if and
only if d0t < mini 6=0 d
i
t (cf. equation (2)). Lemma 1 has demonstrated that this
condition is equivalent to d0t < min1≤i≤M d
i
t. In other words, D
M,N
t = C if and
only if
(2aj −N) + t(2c−N) > 0 ∀1 ≤ j ≤M (9)
(cf. (7)).
For t = 0, (9) can be rewritten as aj > N/2 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ M , and we
obtain the PBP. For t→∞, (9) amounts to c > N/2, and we obtain the CBP.

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Proof of Proposition 2: Our proof is straightforward, using limit results
from probability theory. By assumption we know that s0 is the true situation.
Then, the number of judgments in favor of a premise Aj , aj , is a Binomially
distributed random variable with parameter p and sample size N (a ∼ BN,p).
Similarly, c ∼ BN,p2 . All variables can be written as sums of independent and
identically distributed random variables so that the Strong Laws of Large Num-
bers applies. It follows that P-a.s. aj/N,
N→∞−→ p, c/N N→∞−→ p2. In particular,
with the exception of a set of measure zero,
∀ε ≥ 0 ∃N0 ∀N ≥ N0 : aj
N
∈ (p− ε, p + ε), c
N
∈ (p2 − ε, p2 + ε). (10)
Recall that DM,Nt = C if and only if
(2aj −N) + t(2c−N) > 0 ∀1 ≤ j ≤M
(cf. (9)), which is equivalent to
2
aj
N
− 1 + t
(
2
c
N
− 1
)
> 0 ∀1 ≤ j ≤M.
Now we show that this happens P-almost surely if p > pt := (1/2t)(
√
2t2 + 2t + 1−
1) and N → ∞. Let (3 + 3t)ε := ∣∣2tp2 + 2p− (1 + t)∣∣. A simple computation
yields that 2tp2 + 2p− (1 + t) > 0 if and only if p > pt for t 6= 0 and p > 0.5 for
t = 0. Hence, for p > pt and N ≥ N0, and any 1 ≤ j ≤M ,
2
aj
N
− 1 + t
(
2
c
N
− 1
)
> 2p− 2ε− 1 + t(2p2 − 2ε− 1)
= (3 + 3t)ε− 2ε− 2tε
> 0,
using the limit result (10). Thus, if p > pt, P-almost surely DM,Nt = C, as
desired. Assume on the other hand that p ≤ pt. Then, in virtue of (10), for
N ≥ N0,
2
aj
N
− 1 + t
(
2
c
N
− 1
)
< 2p + 2ε− 1 + t(2p2 + 2ε− 1)
= (−3− 3t)ε + 2ε + 2tε
< 0.
This entails that, incorrectly, DM,Nt = ¬C P-a.s. for increasing N . Thus, if
p > pt, the right conclusion will be eventually selected, and if p ≤ pt, the wrong
conclusion will be eventually selected as N →∞.
It remains to calculate the critical values pt for t ∈ {0, 1,∞}. For t → ∞
(CBP), a simple asymptotic analysis yields the condition p > 1/
√
2, whereas
t = 0 (PBP) amounts to p > 0.5. Finally, in the case t = 1 (MFO), we get the
threshold p > (
√
5− 1)/2. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Proposition 2 has investigated the reliability of
DM,Nt for the case that C is true. Now we presuppose that C is false. In that
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case, there will, for each p > 0.5 and increasing N , be an aj such that P-a.s.
aj < N/2. This implies that D
M,N
t = ¬C, independent of t (cf. (9)). Hence
all distance-based procedures DM,Nt eventually perform reliably if C is false.
Combining this result with proposition 2, we obtain
Rp,q(D
M,N
t ) = P(C)P(D
M,N
t = C|C) + P(¬C)P(DM,Nt = ¬C|¬C)
= qM 1{pt>p} + (1− qM ),
proving equation (5). 
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